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Article 6

The Religion Clause: A Double
Guarantee of Religious Liberty
Edward McGlynn Gaffney,~ r . "
INTRODUCTION:
THEPROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS
WARFAREAND THE RELIGIONCLAUSE
AS "ARTICLES
OF PEACE"
The term "religious warfare" may sound like an oxymoron,
for religion is frequently associated with a commitment to
nonviolence. For example, Jesus amended the law of the
talion' with a teaching that many of his disciples in
* Dean and Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. O 1993
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr.
1. The law of the talion is a provision in the Code of the Covenant, Exodus
21-23, requiring that damages be paid in a tort claim arising from an injury to a
pregnant woman. Exodus 21:23-24; see also Leviticus 24:19. The phrase "life for
life," Exodus 21:23, is often incorrectly interpreted to reflect either an actual
practice of death penalty in ancient Israel or a biblical warrant for the death
penalty in our times. Similarly, the rest of the law of the talion-"eye for eye,
tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound,
stripe for stripe," Exodus 21:24-is incorrectly interpreted to mean that ancient
Israelite courts actually maimed defendants in tort actions. The context of this
passage, however, suggests that this law functioned to mitigate damages in tort
claims. For example, .the immediately preceding verse clearly refers not to
maiming, but to damages that the defendant "shall pay in the presence of the
judges." Exodus 21:22. And the verses immediately aRer the law of the talion also
suggest that this law refers to damages: 'When a man strikes his male or female
slave in the eye and destroys the use of the eye, he shall let the slave go free in
compensation for the eye. If he knocks out a tooth of his male or female slave, he
shall let the slave go free in compensation for the tooth." Exodus 21:26-27 (New
American Bible). Thus the law of the talion functioned to measure the amount of
damages appropriate for a particular sort of injury. As with modern tort claims,
loss of an eye was compensated more than the loss of a tooth. Cf. DALE PATRICK,
OLDTESTAMENT
LAW77 (1985) (stating the principle that a person should suffer to
the degree they caused suffering). For extrabiblical literature that confirms this
interpretation of the law of the talion, see Articles 195-282 of the Code of
Hamrnurabi (1792-1750 B.C.E.), a series of cases setting forth the monetary
damages for tort claims. For example, Article 198 provides: Yf he has destroyed
the eye of a commoner or broken the bone of a commoner, he shall pay one mina
of silver." The Code of Hammurabi, in 1 THE ANCIENTNEAREAST: AN ANTHOLOGY
OF TEXTSAND PICTURES 138, 161-67 (James B. Pritchard ed., 1958); see also OLD
TESTAMENTPARALLELS:
LAWS AND STORIES FROM THE ANCIENTNEAR EAST 66
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subsequent centuries have found hard: "Do not resist an
e~ildoer."~
Although Mohandas Gandhi (1869-1948) was a
Hindu, he made this teaching the core of his moral practice and
with it brought down the mighty British E r n ~ i r e Similarly,
.~
the great Baptist preacher, Martin Luther King, Jr., also made
creative nonviolence the heart of his preaching and practice;'
with which he led an historic struggle t o end Jim Crow
laws-the
segregation codes that might aptly be termed
apartheid, American-style.5
But for many, the teaching of Jesus on nonviolence is hard
to observe. Following this teaching has led some of his disciples
to a death like his.6 The difficulty of this teaching has also led
others-probably
most-of
his disciples to reject it. For
example, at least by the late fourth century when Christianity
became the official, established religion of the Roman Empire,
the duty to serve the Emperor became a religious duty. By the
early fifth century, Augustine, Bishop of Hippo in northern
Africa, had elaborated a theory according to which war was
justifiable; he could even exhort the Emperor to use violence as
a means of coercing dissident Christians o r heretics either t o
conform to the orthodox teaching of the church or to die. By the
eleventh century, the Popes were preaching a "Crusade," a war
under the sign of the cross which marked the breastplate of the

(Victor H. Matthews & Don C. Benjamin eds., 1991).
Matthew 5:39 (New Revised Standard Version).
2.
See MOHANDAS
K . GANDHI,NON-VIOLENTRESISTANCE(1961); THE GANDHI
3.
READER(Homer A. Jack ed., 1956).
4.
MARTINLUTHERKING, JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE, CHAOS OR
COMMUNITY?(1968); MARTINLUTHERKING, JR., STRENGTH
TO LOVE (1964); MARTIN
LUTHERKING, JR., WHY WE CAN'TW A (1963);
~
MARTIN LUTHERKING, JR.,STRIDE
STORY(1958). King, the Pastor of Ebenezer
TOWARD
FREEDOM:THE MONTGOMERY
Baptist Church in Atlanta, was the founding President of the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC). For an account of the role of SCLC in the historic
civil rights movement, see TAYLORBRANCH,
PARTING
THE WATERS:AMERICAIN THE
KINGYEARS,
1954-63 (1988); ALDOND. MORRIS,THE ORIGINSOF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT
(1984); and BAYARD
RUSKIN,STRATEGIES
FOR FREEDOM
(1976).
For an account of the apartheid system of American law after Plessy v.
5.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), see C. VANNWOODWARD,
THE STRANGECAREEROF
JIMCROW(3d ed. 1974).
Many of the early Christian martyrs died as witnesses to their conviction
6.
that "Jesus is Lord," 1 Corinthians 12:3; Philippians 2:11, a religious oath of
fidelity they deemed incompatible with the claim of Roman law, "Caesar is Lord,"
that formed the sacramentum or oath of office of a Roman soldier. See ADOLPH
HARNAcK, MILITIA CHRISTI: THE CHRISTIANRELIGIONAND THE MILITARYIN THE
FIRSTTHREE CENTURIES54, 76 (David M. Gracie trans., 1981) (referring to
TERTUILIAN,ON IDOLATRY,
ch. 19).
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Crusaders. Thus was the cross of Christ, a sacred symbol of the
redemptive nonviolent suffering on behalf of all the nations,
sacrilegiously transformed into the sign of brutal and vicious
military conquest and slaughter of the infidel Jews and
Muslims in the City of Peace, Jerusalem.?
After the Reformation of the western church in the
sixteenth century,' Europe was scarred by frequent outbursts
of violence, related, in part at least, to religious commitments.
For example, the Peace of Augsburg (1555) .put a n end to $he
violence that had arisen over the spread of Lutheran belief i n
the territories of the Holy Roman Empire. Protestant princes,
united in a confederation known as the Protestant League,
extorted an end to these battles from Emperor Charles V, a
Catholic. According to these articles of peace:
Every land that was Lutheran [i.e., governed by a Lutheran
prince] before 1552 might remain so legally, and for the
fbture every ruler of a state was given the choice between the
old religion [Catholicism] and the Lutheran, and his subjects
were to abide by his decision or peaceably leave the

7.
Sir Steven Runciman concludes his magisterial treatment of the Crusades
as follows:
There was so much courage and so little honour, so much devotion and
so little understanding. High ideals were besmirched by cruelty and
greed, enterprise and endurance by a blind and narrow self-righteousness;
and the Holy War itself was nothing more than a long act of intolerance
in the name of God, which is the sin against the Holy Ghost.
3 STEVENRUNCIMAN,
A HISTORYOF THE CRUSADES
480 (1954); see also ROLAND
H.
BAINTON,
CHRISTIAN
A ~ D E TOWARD
S
WAR AND PEACE:A HISTORICALSURVEY
AND CRITICALRE-EVALUATION
111-16 (1960); HANS E. MAYER, THE CRUSADES
(1972).
8. The attitude of Martin Luther toward war was ambivalent. On the one
hand, he invoked Acts 5:29 (We must obey God rather than menw) for the
conclusion that "we should neither follow nor help a prince who desired to go to
war [ifl his cause was clearly unrighteous." 44 MARTINLUTHER,Treatise on Good
Works, in LUTHER'SWORKS15, 100 (Helmut T. Lehmann ed., 1966) (1520); see also
46 MARTINLUTHER, Open Letter on the Harsh Book Against the Peasants, in
LUTHER'SWORKS, supra, at 63, 77 (1525); 46 MARTIN LUTHER, Whether Soldiers,
Too, Can Be Saved?, in LUTHER'S WORKS, supra, at 87, 130 (1526). On the other
hand, Luther clearly contemplates in the same texts that there may be some
instances in which a prince waging war justly should be obeyed. For example,
Article 16 of the Augsburg Confession (1530) provides that a Christian may wage
war justly (jure bellare). For a commentary on this article of the Confession, see
GEORGEW. FORELL& JAMES
F. MCCUE, CONFESSINGONE FAITH: A JOINT
COMMENTARY
ON THE AUGSBURGCONFESSIONBY LUTHERAN
AND CATHOLIC
THEOLOGIANS 322-33 (1982).
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state-the famous principle of cujus regio ejus religio [whose
region, his religion], though the actual phrase is later.g

Similarly, prompted by the territorial wars which ensued
even after the Peace of Augsburg, the Formula of Concord
(1577) established not only a rigorous peace but also contained
"an uncompromising [Lutheran] exclusion of the Reformed
[ C a l v i n i s t ] doctrine of t h e E u c h a r i s t a n d . . . of
predestination."1° At least in its early phase, the Thirty Years
Wai. was a war of Calvinists against Catholics, with Lutherans
remaining aloof." The provoking incident occurred on April
11, 1606, when Protestants attacked a Catholic ceremonial
procession in the heavily Protestant city of Donauworth in
southern Germany. A year later Maximilian of Bavaria
occupied the city, annexed it to Bavaria, installed Jesuits in the
church, and made it "forcibly Catholic."" "In 1608 the
Protestant states formed the Evangelical Union to defend
Protestant states attacked in contravention of the Peace of
Aug~burg."'~Led by Maximilian of Bavaria, Catholics formed
a rival alliance known as the Catholic League in the same
year. The war came to an end with the Peace of Westphalia in
1645. Although the war was fought over political rivalry as
much as religious c~rnmitments,'~
it is recalled as a classic
instance of "religious warfare."
I n England, the struggle to establish Parliamentary
hegemony was likewise marked by deep religious commitments.
The Royalist banners unfurled on the battlefields of the Civil
War read, "For God, For King, For Country." The banners of
the Cromwellians read, "Pray Fervently, Fight ~ o l d l ~ . " ' ~
Across the sea in what George Bernard Shaw called "John
Bull's Other Island," the Irish experienced not only eight
centuries of foreign rule, but also cruel denial of their religious
liberty.16 The dissolution of the monasteries by Henry VIII
9.
OWENCHADWICK,
THE REFORMATION
143 (1972).
10.
Id. at 144.
11. Id. at 317.
12.
Id. at 316.
Id.
13.
"After 1635 the war was no longer in any real sense a religious war, but a
14.
modern European war dependent on rivalry between revived France and imperial
Germany." Id. at 317.
15.
For a brief discussion of the Puritan Revolution from the perspective of a
history of war, see BAINTON,supra note 7, at 147-51. See also DEREKHIRST,
AUTHORITY
AND CONFUCT: ENGLAND,1603-1658, at 221-363 (1986).
See 3 A NEWH I ~ R O
YF IRELAND:
EARLYMODERNIRELAND
(Theodore W.
16.
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devastated the Catholic community in Ireland as well as in
England," and the Penal Laws enacted under Elizabeth I
criminally punished Roman Catholics for exercising their
religious commitments.1s The armies, first of Cromwell and
later of William of Orange, slaughtered innocent Irish civilians
by the thousands.lg The Protestant rulers illegally confiscated
the lands and homes of the natives and gave them to the
Presbyterians "planted" there by "Good King Billy."20
More recently, the continuous violence in the northern part
of Ireland has been characterized by uninformed media reports
as a "religious war." I have no brief to write for this violence,
but I do not view it primarily in religious terms. It strikes me
as a struggle primarily over the legitimacy of imperial
domination and the continuous denial of political and civil
rights to people because of their religious commitments. I t is,
moreover, about as probable to believe that the occupying
British Army is an effective peace-keeping force in Ireland as it
is to think that the U.S. Marines could keep the peace in
Lebanoa2'
However one characterizes the protracted conflict in the
northern part of Ireland, we do not lack recent evidence of
religiously grounded violence. Bosnia is torn apart by violent
conflict between Serbs and Muslims. In Lebanon and Israel,
bloody strife continues between Jew and Arab and between

Moody et al. eds., 1976).
17. The two statutes ordering the dissolution of the monasteries were 27 Hen.
THE
8, ch. 28 (1536), 31 Hen. 8, ch. 13 (1539); see BRENDONBRADSHAW,
OF THE REIJGIOUSORDERS IN IRELAND UNDERHENRYVaI (1974).
DISSOLUTION
212-46 (1950); GEOFFREY
R. ELTON,
18. See S.T. BONDOFF,TUDORENGLAND
ENGLAND,1509-1558 (1977); GEOFFREY
R. ELTON,
REFORMAND REFORMATION:
ENGLAND
UNDERTHE TUDORS
(1955).
19. See T.C. BARNARD,
CROMWELUN
IRELAND
(1975).
20.
The Irish who remember the invasion of William of Orange from the
underside usually stomp their feet twice when they say "God bless King Billy." It
is like the custom of observant Jews who make a lot of noise when the name of
Haman, prototypical enemy of the Jews, is mentioned in the reading of the Book
of Esther at the feast of Purim. For a dispassionate analysis of the British attitude
toward the native Irish and the native Americans in the seventeenth century, see
William Bassett, The Myth of the Nomad in Property Law, 4 J.L. & RELIGION133
(1986).
21.
The most obvious difference in this comparison is that Northern Ireland is
part of the United Kingdom, whereas Lebanon is not part of the United States.
The point of the comparison, however, is that many of the contending natives in
both places resent the presence of foreigners who are obviously committed to one
side of an ongoing conflict.
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Arab and Arab. In Iran and Iraq a jihad has been waged
ferociously over the past decade.
These images of religiously grounded violence throughout
the world lend a note of urgency to the conversation reflected
in this symposium. It is important that we grasp correctly the
meaning of the First Amendment Religion Clause. The
importance of doing so is crucial not only to our republic, but
also to many parts of the world that do not live with the
blessing of the First Amendment.
Some scholars, notably William Marshall, Lawrence Solum,
and Jeffrey Stout, have suggested that the story of violence
sometimes associated with religion leads in the direction of
placing strong societal limits on religion.22 Dean Mark
Schwehn summarizes the arguments of Professor Stout as
follows:
Stout opposes efforts to strengthen the public influence of
religion in part because he remains even today traumatized
by the religious wars of the seventeenth century, events that
constitute the crucial episode in the formation of the academic
conscience of the West. Thus, for example, Stout characterizes
our society's recognition that the good life must allow for our
inability to agree upon any one model of the good life as
phronesis "forged in the religious strife of early modern
Europe." He argues that theology has lost credibility among
intellectuals largely because it "was unable to provide a
vocabulary for debating and deciding matters without resort
to violence." And he often thinks of contemporary religion in
terms of Belfast and Beirut, Teheran and Lynchburg, places
that give him "ample reasons for concern."23

Schwehn acknowledges that passionate religious commitments
have led to destructive tribalism and violence. But he notes
with equal force the evil of wholly secular totalitarian regimes
of the left and right that have left behind human carnage by
the millions in our own century. Thus, he concludes sensibly
that Stout's "highly selective recognition of the past" should not
serve as a warrant for the repression or privatization of

22.
See WILLIAM
P. MARSHALL,THE PUBLICSQUARE
AND THE OTHERSIDE OF
RELIGION(forthcoming 1993); JEFFREYSTOUT,ETHICSAFTERBABEL:THE LANGUAGE
OF MORALSAND THEIRDISCONTENTS
222-23, 238 (1988); Lawrence B. Solum, Faith
and Justice, 39 DEPAULL. REV. 1083, 1096-97 (1990).
MARK R. SCHWEHN, EXILES FROM EDEN: RELIGIONAND THE ACADEMIC
23.
VOCATION
IN AMERICA 54 (1993) (quoting STOUT,
supra note 22, at 223, 238).
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religion, any more than a mention of Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and
Pol Pot should serve as an argument against secularism per
In short, Professors Marshall, Solum, and Stout prove too
much when they suggest that explicitly religious arguments
must be avoided in public discourse so as to avoid the
repetition of the "holy wars" of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. Their fears, however, might be allayed if the virtues
of "technical competence, civil intelligibility, and political
courtesy'' were viewed as imperatives for both religious and
nonreligious participants in public policy debate.25 But I
would not place upon religious discourse any stricter regulation
than that which is permissible for secular speech.26
Although I am frightened by images of religiously
grounded violence elsewhere, I note that they are abroad, and
that we have found a different way of dealing with our deepest
differences i n the American experience. For that very reason, I
think that we should tone down some of the excessive rhetoric
about a "culture war" now raging in A~nerica.~'When
measured against the real shedding of real blood involved i n
the real wars abroad, our struggles over cultural influence and
control are quite tame. That is not to say that we can afford to
go about our business with reckless disregard for courtesy. On
the contrary, a s the Williamsburg Charter-a bicentennial
document celebrating religious liberty-puts it, "The issue is
The Charter states:
not only what we debate, but
24.

Id.

25. J. Bryan Hehir, Responsibilities and Temptations of Power: A Catholic View,
8 J.L. & RELIGION 71, 82 (1988); see also FREDERICKM. GEDICKS & ROGER
HENDRM, CHOOSINGTHE DREAM:THE FUTUREOF RELIGIONIN AMERICANPUBLIC
LIFE(1991); RICHARDJ. NEUHAUS,THE NAKEDPUBLIC
SQUARE
(1984); Edward M.
Gaffney, Politics Without Brackets on Religious Convictions: Michael Perry and
Bruce Ackmman on Neutrality, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1143, 1188-94 (1989); Frederick M.
Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671 (1992).
26.
See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
27.
See JAMES
D. HUNTER,CULTUREWARS:THE STRUGGLETO DEFINE AMERICA
(1991). Professor Hunter maintains that his title is simply a translation of the
German term, Kulturkumpf. Since the Geman word for "war" is not Kampf, but
=kg, it might be more accurate to speak of a cultural struggle, of great
magnitude and moment, than to speak of culture wars. For all the modish
appropriation of militaristic metaphors by groups like the National Organization for
Women, which describes their strategy planning office as the "war room," it might
help elevate the tone of political discourse if all of us would tone down our
excessive rhetoric.
The Williamsburg Charter, 8 J.L. & RELIGION5, 11 (1990). The Charter
28.
committed its signatories to the propositions that "those who claim the right to
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The Religious Liberty provisions are not "articles of faith"
concerned with the substance of particular doctrines or of
policy issues. They are "articles of peace" concerned with the
constitutional constraints and the shared prior understanding
within which the American people can engage their
differences in a civil manner and thus provide for both
religious liberty and stable public g~vernrnent.'~

,

Against this preliminary discussion of the Religion Clause
as "articles of peace," I wish t o explore three points about "new
directions in religious liberty." First, the two provisions of the
First Amendment Religious Liberty Clause-one prohibiting
the establishment of religion and the other guaranteeing the
free exercise of religion-ar e not contradictory in any sense,
but are "mutually reinforcing provisions [that] act as a double
guarantee of religious liberty."30 Second, although religious
freedom as a significant constitutional value began to erode
long before William H. Rehnquist became the Chief Justice in
1986, it has come to a low point in the past few years. Third, I
explore the impact of Employment Division v. Smith3' on the
lower courts and other government agencies and conclude that
remedial legislation is sorely needed to restore the fmt of civil
liberties to the position of honor it deserves in our republic.

I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE PROHIBITION AGAINST
AN ESTABLISHMENT
OF R.EXIGION AND THE GUARANTEE
OF FREEEXERCISE
OF RELIGION
First, I will attempt t o reconcile free exercise concerns and
the prohibition against a governmental establishment of
religion. This point is fundamental to any interpretation of the
First Amendment. Functionally, it makes sense for litigators to
proceed as though there were two separate provisions dealing
with religion, but I concede this point only because the case
law of the modem period has done so. Able historians like
Thomas Curry have noted that the two ways of speaking of
influence should accept the responsibility not to inflame," id. at 20, and "those who
claim the right to participate should accept the responsibility to persuade." Id. at
2 1.
29.
Id. at 12. The conception of the Religious Liberty Clause as "articles of
peace" was articulated in JOHN C. MURRAY,
WE HOLDTHESE TRUTHS:CATHOLIC
REFLECTIONSON THE AMERICANPROPOSITION
45-79 (1960).
The Williamsburg Charter, supra no* 28, at 6.
30.
31.
494 U.S.872 (1990).

1891 DOUBLE GUARANTEE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 197
religion in the First Amendment were almost interchangeable
and virtually indistinguishable in the eighteenth century.s2
The bifurcation of the Religion Clause in the modern
period has led to serious problems in theory, in the metaphors
used to describe the theory, and i n practice. An example of this
theoretical confusion is the conflict the Court built into the
standards announced in Lemon u. Kurtzmans3 for determining
a violation of the Establishment Clause. Lemon teaches that
the Establishment Clause criteria prohibited any government
practice that did not have a secular purpose.34 A year later
the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause may only be
invoked by adherents to a religious faith, not to a general
secular view.35 It makes little sense as a matter of logic that
the Establishment Clause must prohibit what the Free
Exercise Clause requires. And if that result did not make for
coherent constitutional theory, the theory became worse i n
Smith, when the so-called tension between the clauses was
removed by eliminating the vigor and force of the Free Exercise
Clause. That is like fixing a headache by lopping off the head.
In his characteristically humorous manner, Jim Gordon put it
this way: '[According to the Smith case,] the free exercise
clause . . . generously permits you to have whatever religious
beliefs you want. You just can't 'exercise' them. I t is comforting
to know that the protection of religious liberty in America is
now just as broad as it is in NORTH KOREA."36 I realize that
this is a gross exaggeration to which the North Koreans might
take exception.
The "metaphors" the Court has chosen to describe the
relationship between the two parts of the Religion Clause are
not very helpful either. Chief Justice Burger suggested the
image of a ship captain struggling to find a "neutral course
between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in
absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical
extreme, would tend to clash with the other.7737Taking this
metaphor further, Chief Justice Rehnquist has described the

32.
TO THE

33.
34.
35.
36.

THOMAS
J. CURRY,THE FIRSTFREEDOMS:
CHURCH AND STATEIN AMERICA
PASSAGE
OF THE FIRSTAMENDMENT
216-17 (1986).
403 U.S. 602 (1971).

Id. at 612.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 US. 205, 215 (1972).
James D. Gordon 111, An Unofficial Guide to the Bill of Rights, 1992 B.Y.U.

L. REV.371, 371.
37.

Walz v.

Tax Comm'n, 397 US. 664, 668-89 (1970).
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relationship between the two Clauses as a narrow channel
bordered by a Scylla and a Charybdis through which the Court
must steer.3s This surely qualifies for the New Yorker's "Block
that Metaphor" column. It is especially inappropriate because it
implies a negative connotation for both parts of the Religion
Clause, imagined to be twin perils or dangers, neither of which
could be evaded without risking the other.39 The metaphors
the Court uses make it appear as if James Madison and his
colleagues h a d planned a big tug-of-war between
disharmonious and brutal rivals by craRing the first two
provisions of the First Amendment in a way that made little
sense without the valiant efforts of the Court in the late
twentieth century to "reconcile" the seeming "conflict" between
them?'
An example of the practical confusion in this area is that
the Court has created two different standards for who may
bring an Establishment Clause complaint and who may allege
a free exercise violation. The point is not a fine academic one,
but one with important practical consequences. Without a
clearer understanding of the relationship between the two
parts of the Religion Clause, the outcome of religious liberty
cases will depend on the cleverness of lawyers characterizing a
case a s one arising under the establishment provision or the
free exercise provision. In my view, that is no blessing to the
republic.
The Williamsburg Charter notes that the two parts of the
Religion Clause are "mutually reinforcing provisions [that] act
as a double guarantee of religious liberty. . . . Together the
clauses form a strong bulwark against suppression of religious
liberty."41 One of the drafters of the Charter, Richard John
Neuhaus, has written:
The conventional wisdom is that there are two religion
clauses that must somehow be "balanced," one against the

38.
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
see also Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 28 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); id. at 42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39.
Scylla was a dangerous rock on the Italian side of the Straits of Messina;
Charybdis was a nearby whirlpool; these perils were represented as female
monsters in ancient mythology.
40.
See Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal
DAMEL. REV.
Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE
311 (1986).
The Williamsburg Charter, supra note 28, at 6, 16.
41.
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other. But these provisions of the First Amendment are not
against each other. Each is in the service of the other. More
precisely, there is one religion clause, not two. The meaning
of a "clause," apart from the narrowly grammatical, is that it
is an article or stipulation. The two-part religion clause of the
First Amendment stipulates that there must be no law
respecting an establishment of religion. The reason for this is
to avoid any infringement of the free exercise of religion.
Non-establishment is not a good in itself, i t does not stand on
its own feet. The positive good is free exercise, to which
non-establishment is i n s t r ~ m e n t a l . ~ ~

I do not read Neuhaus t o be downplaying either the
historical or the contemporary significance of the prohibition
against an established religion. I read him simply to be
reminding us that the reason for the prohibition of an
established religion-both at the time of the framing and
now-is to promote religious liberty. Non-establishment of
religion is "instrumental" in this sense. As philosophers know,
however, the term "instrumental" is not a term of derision; it is
language borrowed from an Aristotelian understanding of
causation that indicates the channel through which the goal of
religious liberty is attained in our society.43
Professor Franklin Gamwell of the University of Chicago
Divinity School has proposed that we think of the free exercise
guarantee as the establishment of the religious question in
America, and that we think of the no-establishment provision
as the prohibition of a governmental answer to that question.
This is a dramatically different approach t o Professor
Marshall's suggestion that we should not really try to get out of
the Religion Clause anything more than we could get out of the
rest of the First Amendment." To quote again from the
Williamsburg Charter:
Far from being a sub-category of free speech or a
constitutional redundancy, religious liberty i s distinct and

42.
Richard J. Neuhaus, Contending for the Future: Overcoming the pfefferian
Inversion, 8 J.L. & RELIGION115, 115-16 (1990); see also Richard J. Neuhaus, A
New Order of Religious Freedom, 60 GEO.WASH.
L. REV.620, 626-31 (1992).
Aristotle's discussion of four kinds of causes or explanatory
43.
principles-efficient, final, material, and formal-is found in his METAPHYSICS1.3
(W.D. Ross ed., 1988). See also Ruliard Taylor, Causation, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY
56 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
William P. Marshall, Solving the f i e Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as
44.
Expression, 67 MINN.L. REV.545, 575-93 (1983).
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foundational. Far from being simply an individual right,
religious liberty is a positive social good. Far from denigrating
religion as a social or political "problem,"the separation of
Church and State is both the saving of religion &om the
temptation of political power and an achievement inspired in
large part by religion itself. Far from weakening religion,
disestablishment has, as an historical fact, enabled it to
flourish.45

In the interests of religious liberty, both provisions are
crucial; as double guarantees, they provide a framework from
which we, as a people, are able to pursue happiness. Because
they have been viewed as polar, however, the resulting tension
has tended to erode the understanding that both provisions of
the Religion Clause are meant to foster and protect religious
freedom.

11. THE EROSIONOF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM
BEFORETHE REHNQUISTCOURT
With notable exceptionsf there is broad consensus
among scholars and religious leaders that the Court erred
grievously in Employment Division v. Smith.47I regard Smith
as the nadir of judicial contempt for the first of our civil
liberties. To defend this conclusion, it is necessary to trace the
broad contours of the development of free exercise doctrine.
Because they are familiar, I do so briefly.
In the first period of the republic, the Bill of Rights had no
application to the several states, but governed the regulatory
~ ~ in its first
reach only of the national g ~ v e r n m e n t .And
application to congressional legislation, the Free Exercise
Clause proved but a parchment barrier to statutes that codified
massive hostility against the Mormons. In a series of three

45.
The Williamsburg Charter, supra note 28, at 17.
46.
Professors William Marshall, Mark Tushnet, and Ellis West have argued
that the Free Exercise Clause should not be relied upon for exemptions from
generally applicable laws. See Marshall, supra note 22; William P. Marshall, The
Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASEW.
RES. L. REV. 357 (1989); Mark V. Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme
Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373; Mark V. Tushnet, The
Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO.L.J. 1691
(1988); Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4
NOTRE
DAMEJ.L. ETHICS& PUB. POL'Y591 (1990).
47.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Barron v. Mayor & City Council, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
48.
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cases in the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
reinforced with judicial authority the hostility toward the
Mormons manifested in the congressional legislation that
singled them out in an invidious manner.49 In the first case,
Reynolds v. United States," the Court ruled that Congress
could impose criminal sanctions against the Mormon practice of
plural marriage; the Court noted, however, that religious
beliefs were beyond the regulatory reach of the government.51
In the second case, Davis v. Beason:' the belief-conduct
distinction the Court had touted in Reynolds was exposed as a
sham, for Mormons were deprived of the franchise because of
their belief in plural marriage. In the third case, aptly styled
Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. United States,s3 the Court went still further,
divesting the Mormon church of its property until it changed
its view on plural marriage. This is the sort of dictatorial rule
that one associates with Henry VIII's dissolution of the
monasteries in sixteenth century England and Ireland:4 not
with the spirit of the First Amendment. It is important to note
that the Smith Court expressly relied on the Reynolds case,
and implicitly on its progeny, which had ruled that the Free
Exercise Clause imposed no serious obstacle to congressional
legislation targeted a t a vulnerable and unpopular religious
minority.55
In 1925, the Supreme Court began the process of
incorporating various guarantees of the Bill of Rights against
the several states through the Due Process Clause of the
~ ~ 1940 the Court thought it
Fourteenth A m e n d ~ n e n t . By
desirable to extend the reach of the Free Exercise Clause to the
states as well and did so in Cantwell v. Connectic~t.~~
Cantwell marked a breakthrough made possible by the

See GUSTAWS MYERS,
HISTORY
OF BIGOTRYIN THE UNITEDSTATES 158-62
49.
(1940); Frederick M. Gedicks, The Integrity of Survival: A Mormon Response to
Stanley Hauerwas, 42 DEPAULL. REV. 167 (1992).
50.
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
51. Id. at 164, 166.
52.
133 U.S. 333 (1890).
53.
136 U.S. 1 (1890).
54.
See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
55.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-85 (1990).
See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (Free Speech Clause
56.
applicable to the states); Near v. Minnesota ex reZ. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)
(Free Press Clause applicable to the states).
57.
310 U S . 296 (1940).
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persistence of the Jehovah's Witnesses, who brought to the
Court's attention a series of cases illustrating the brutality of
political power intolerant of a small, unpopular minority
In this respect, the cases involving the Jehovah's
Witnesses were a harbinger of the stance that the Court was
later to take against racial discrimination in Brown v. Board of
Ed~cation.~'Not only religious minorities, but also racial
minorities could take comfort from Justice Jackson's assurance
in the second flag-salute case that "freedom of worship . . . and
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they
depend on the outcome of no election^.'"^ This was a solid
commitment of an independent judiciary that it would enforce
the limits placed on our government by the founders in the Bill
of Rights.
The begiming of the modern period of free exercise
doctrine was Sherbert v. Verner,61 which marked a n important
departure from a series of cases involving Sunday closing laws
that had been decided adversely to Jews only two years before
Sherbert.62In Sherbert, Justice Breman tried to give religious
freedom more effective protection than it had previously
enjoyed. To achieve this end, he imported from equal protection
analysis in cases involving racial discrimination the standard
requiring the government to show that its interest in a racial
classification was truly "compelling." After the breakthrough
decision in Brown v. Board of Education," in case after case
in the race area, the Court repeatedly told the government that
no interest that it might articulate on behalf of Jim Crow laws
(or American apartheid)64could match this strict standard of
review.65
In addition, Justice Brennan reached out to Commerce
,~~
Clause cases such as Dean Milk Co. v. City of M a d i s ~ n to
require further that the government must use the "least
restrictive alternative" to achieve its "compelling interest." In

58. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pe~sylvania,319 U.S. 105 (1943).
59. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
60. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
61. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
62. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
63. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
64. See WOODWARD,
supra note 5.
65. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating state
prohibition of interracial marriage).
66. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
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Dean Milk the Court ruled that the City of Madison had a
powerful interest in the purity of milk sold to its inhabitants.
But the Court held that this goal could be achieved by
requiring pasteurization of milk in Illinois as easily as it could
by requiring that the milk be transported in its raw form up to
Wisconsin for pasteurization and inspection, then be
transported back down to Illinois for packaging, and then be
transported up to Wisconsin again for sale. The Court correctly
reasoned that the imposition of additional transportation costs
on the out-of-state farmers was a none-too-subtle way of
discriminating against them in favor of local merchants.
By combining these two standards-compelling
state
interest and least restrictive alternative-into one new test for
the adjudication of claims arising under the Free Exercise
Clause, the Sherbert court sent a signal to lower courts that
religious freedom was to be given the same favored status
accorded to the national commitment to racial equality (Brown
v. Board of Education) and to the elimination of tariff barriers
in a national common market (Dean Milk). This new standard
may not have been perfect. (What test that involves balancing
is perfect?) But the test proved to be fairly effective in the
lower courts as a way of safeguarding religious freedom in a n
environment that had become pervasively regulated.
The new test, moreover, was not limited to the facts of the
unemployment compensation claim sought by Ms. Sherbert but
was invoked by the Court as a general principle in virtually all
the free exercise cases it decided in the past two decades.67 Of
all these cases involving facts other than a n unemployment
compensation claim, one of the few actually won by a religious
adherent was Wisconsin v. Yoder!j8 Yoder involved the
religious claim of Amish parents that their religious practices
and communal life would be injured by the application of a
facially neutral, generally applicable norm requiring
67. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); O'Lone v. Estate
of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986);
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985); Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252
(1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437 (1971).
68.
406 U.S. 205 (1972). See also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)
(invalidating state statute prohibiting clergy from seeking office because it
conditioned the right to free exercise of religion on the surrender of the right to
seek office).
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compulsory school attendance by their children after the eighth
grade. Professor M c C o ~ e l lcharacterizes the cases lost by
religious claimants as follows:
Orthodox Jews have been expelled from the military for
wearing yarmulkes; a religious community in which all
members worked for the church and believed that acceptance
of wages would be an affront to God has been forced to yield
to the minimum wage; religious colleges have been denied tax
exemptions for enforcing what they regard to be religiously
compelled moral regulations; Amish farmers who refuse Social
Security benefits have been forced to pay Social Security
taxes; and Muslim prisoners have been denied the right to
challenge prison regulations that conflict with their worship
schedule?'

Although purporting to surround free exercise of religion with a
lot of protection, the Court either trivialized the burden on
religion imposed by the demands of the modern regulatory
state or rejected the validity of a n exemption based on religious
grounds.
I n his article on Smith, Professor McConnell described free
exercise doctrine before Smith as a sort of Potemkin village,?'
in which visitors could see with their own eyes Soviets who
were grateful to Josef Stalin for an abundance of ice cream and
for other delights of their collectivized lives. Only the most
gullible tourist could have believed the rosy picture created by
the Potemkin village, and only a naive observer of religious
liberty in this country would say that everything has been well
in order either before or after Smith. At least on paper,
however, the compelling state interest and least restrictive
alternative standard appeared to be operative in a unanimous
decision a s recently as a few months before Smith.?'
Whatever may have been true for other cases, the Supreme
Court has laid down an unbroken line of unemployment
compensation cases that are directly relevant to the
unemployment compensation claim presented in Smith. In this
line of cases, the Court repeatedly adhered to the doctrine that

69.
Michael W. McComell, Why "Separation" Is Not the Key to Church-State
Relations, 107 CHRISTIAN
CENTURY
43, 46 (Jan. 19, 1989).
70.
Michael W. McConnell, Free Ezrcise Revisionism and the Smith Decision,
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1118 (1990).
71.
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. California Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378,
384 (1990).
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the Free
enforce a
religious
attaining

Exercise Clause did not allow the government to
law or policy that burdens the exercise of a sincere
belief unless it is the least restrictive means of
a particularly important secular ~bjective.?~
111. THEEROSIONOF FREEEXERCISEBY
THE R~~HNQUIST
COURT
A. Pre-Smith Cases: Hobbie, O'Lone,
Lyng, Frazee, and Swaggart

~ ~ in
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals C o m m i s ~ i o nwas
some senses an unremarkable case that simply extended the
Sherbert principle to the situation of a woman whose religious
conflict with her secular duty arose during the course of her
employment rather than before it. Paula Hobbie had been employed by a Florida jeweler for some two and one-half years
until her discharge. When Hobbie began her employment, she
was not a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. She
later became a baptized member of that church, which forbids
its members from secular activities during the period between
sundown Friday and sundown Saturday. Although the situation
of Ms. Hobbie was virtually identical to that of Ms. Sherbert,
the Florida authorities denied Hobbie's request for unemployment compensation benefits on the ground that she had adopted new religious beliefs that conflicted with the requirements of
her job. The Supreme Court reversed, clarifying that the free
exercise of religion includes the right to adopt new beliefs or to
convert from one faith to another. Justice Rehnquist Ned a
dissent in Hobbie stating that he continued to adhere to his
dissent in Thomas v. Review Board.74
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Hobbie was the
Court's rejection of the view of free exercise urged by Solicitor
General Charles Fried. In an amicus brief for the United
States, he argued:
[Flree exercise claims should generally not be entertained
when the state's actions, rather than prohibiting or directly
seeking to discourage a religious practice, have an indirect

72. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U S . 829 (1989);
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
73.
480 U.S. 136 (1987).
Thomas,450 US. at 720-27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
74.
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and unintended disadvantaging impact on an individual's
choice to engage in a particular religious practice. Even in
such cases of indirect disadvantaging, a free exercise claim
may be made out, however, if (a) the state's action is not
neutral between religious practices, or between religious and
other analogous personal choices, or (b) the action bears so
heavily on an individual's choice as to have virtually the preclusive effect of a direct p r ~ h i b i t i o n . ~ ~

The Court did not follow Fried's suggestion on that occasion
but came to adopt it in an even more extreme form in Smith.
In that same Term, the Court ruled in Ozone u. Estate of
S h a b a ~ z that
? ~ prisons do not have to do much to accommodate the prayer life of Muslim prisoners. Fifteen years earlier,
in Cruz u. Beto, the Court had required the Texas correctional
system to afford a Buddhist prisoner "a reasonable opportunity
of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded
fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts."?? This has the flavor of the rule announced by the
Court in Larson v. Valente, where Justice Brennan wrote: "The
clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one
religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another."78 Despite the fact that Cruz expressly referred to the
accommodation of the worship practices of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews within the state prisons, and despite the courtordered accommodation of the dietary requirements of observant Jewish prisoners,7g the Shabazz Court failed even to acknowledge either Cruz or Sherbert as relevant precedents affording protection to the free exercise rights of Muslim state
prisoners. It should come as no surprise that the lower courts
since Smith have given short shrift to the free exercise claims
brought by such prisoner^.'^

75.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees a t 5,
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 US. 136 (1986) (No. 85-993).
76.
482 US. 342 (1987).
77.
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam); see also Cooper v.
Pate, 378 US. 546 (1964).
78.
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
79.
Cruz, 405 U.S. at 319-20; see also Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.
1975) (requiring federal prison to provide Orthodox Jewish prisoner with a diet
that would keep the prisoner in good health without violating kosher laws).
See Al-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680, 685-89 (7th Cir. 1991); Hunafa v.
80.
Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 47-49 (7th Cir. 1990).
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In Lyng u. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,8l
the Court ruled that the Free Exercise Clause interposed no
barrier to the Government's logging and road construction
activities on lands used for religious purposes by several Native
American tribes. At the heart of Justice O'Connor's proposal of
a n endorsement test for Establishment Clause cases is the
concern that the government must never convey a disparaging
view of the beliefs and practices of religious communities lest
the members of these groups have cause to perceive themselves
as outsiders or as second-class ~itizens.'~
Despite the fact that
there is no group in our history whose religious beliefs and
practices have been subjected to greater abuse or more systematic violation, there is no trace of O'Comor's concern about the
second-class character of the Native Americans before the
Court in Lyng. Indeed, O'Connor even conceded in Lyng that it
was undisputed that the building of the proposed forest road
through land held sacred by the Native Americans "could have
devastating effects on traditional Indian religious p r a c t i ~ e s . " ~ ~
Thus O'Comor appears to have proposed a test in the establishment context that she ignores in a free-exercise context, despite its clear relevance to that concern.
As if we had not heard enough from the Court on unemployment compensation cases (Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie),
the Court accepted another one in the 1988 Term. In Frazee v.
Illinois Department of Employment Se~urity,'~
the Court was
able to clarify for the fourth time that unemployment benefits
may not be withheld from a worker whose religious convictions
about refraining from work on her Sabbath conflicted with her
job assignment. Two minor differences from Sherbert were
present in Frazee. First, the day on which the petitioner refused to work was Sunday, not Saturday. Second, the basis for
this refusal arose &om individual conscience rather than from
the official teaching of a religious body. The Court readily disposed of those differences and ruled for the religious claimant.

81.
485 US. 439 (1988).
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
82.
Lynch v. D o ~ e l l y ,465 U.S.668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Co~or,J., concurring); see also
Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985) ("[A] core purpose of the
Establishment Clause is violated" where government action "conveys a message of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion.") (citation omitted).
83. Q n g , 485 U.S. at 451.
84.
489 U.S. 829 (1989).
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The 1989 Term proved t o be a disaster for free exercise of
religion. Smith is the precedent that everyone recalls from that
Term, but religious freedom was also dealt a powerful blow in
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries u. California Board of Equal izafor cash to pay its bills after the taxpayer ret i ~ n . 'Pressed
~
volt enacted caps on property taxes in Proposition 13, the State
of California has relied increasingly on other forms of taxation,
such as sales and use taxes, to raise revenue. The State Board
of Equalizations6 singled out an unpopular evangelist as the
target of its efforts to establish a precedent that it had the
power t o tax the distribution of religious literature. In the
previous Term, the Court in Texas Monthly, Inc. u. Bullock had
invalidated under the Establishment Clause a Texas statute
that provided an exemption for religious literature from sales
and use taxes, but the Court left open the question of whether
the Free Exercise Clause required the states t o refrain from
imposing a tax on such l i t e r a t ~ e . 'The
~ Court answered that
question resoundingly in the negative in Swaggart Ministries.
Justice O'Connor wrote for a unanimous Court in Swaggart
Ministries that "the collection and payment of the generally
applicable tax in this case imposes no constitutionally significant burden on appellant's religious practices or belief^."^'
O'Connor acknowledged that a "more onerous tax rate, even if
generally applicable, might effectively choke off an adherent's
religious practices,"89but she did not think that the tax before
the Court constituted a choke-hold strangling religious exercise.
In the wake of the beating of Rodney King, it is no comfort that
the Court took such a casual attitude toward the notorious and
lethal "choke-hold" technique employed by the Los Angeles
It is equally disastrous for religious freePolice De~artment.~'
dom that the transmission of religious literature to the adherents of one's own faith may be subjected to one of the most
complicated forms of taxation ever devised, with relief from
taxation postponed until a religious organization is being
choked to death. As if setting the stage for the major reversal

85. 493 US. 378 (1990).
86. I love the way California describes its taxing authority.
87. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). Justice B r e ~ a n ,writing
for three Justices, held that a state sales tax exemption for religious publications
violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 25.
88. 493 US. at 392.
89. Id.
90. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.95 (1983).
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to follow in Smith, the Court all but overruled earlier resounding victories for religious freedom, distinguishing Murdock u.
Pennsylvaniag1 and Follett v. Town of McCormickgZon the
ground that they were limited t o a flat occupational tax. And
Justice O'Connor brushed aside in a single sentence the fear
that Justice Scalia had voiced in the previous Term in Texas
Monthly about discriminatory enforcement bf the tax: "There is
no danger that appellant's religious activity is being singled out
for special and burdensome treatment.'@3
The Court also rejected the contention that the "on-site
inspections of appellant's evangelistic crusades, lengthy on-site
audits, examinations of appellant's books and records, threats
of criminal prosecution, and layers of administrative and judicial proceeding^'@^ represented an excessive entanglement of
the government with religion.g5If the government interferes
with a religious body, one would normally view such an interference as a free exercise violation. But the Court has developed this standard as though it were only an aspect of
e~tablishment.'~
For example, it used the entanglement test to
invalidate a federal program providing remedial reading and
math instruction to the children of poor parents:'
even
though there was no evidence whatsoever in the record of the
" 'detailed monitoring and close administrative contact' between
secular and religious bodies"g8that the Swaggart Ministries
Court held necessary to make out a claim of excessive entanglement. Evidently, entanglement is in the eyes of the beholder. At least it looks very different when a religious body is
being taxed (no entanglement) than when children attending a
religious school are being given aid on an evenhanded basis
(entanglement).

319 U.S. 105 (1943) (invalidating application of occupational license tax to
91.
sale of religious literature by Jehovah's Witnesses).
92.
321 U.S. 573 (1944).
Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S.at 390.
93.
94.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 392-97.
95.
96.
See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.402 (1985); see also Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v.
97.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
493 U.S. at 395 (quoting Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97
98.
(1989)).
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B. The Smith Case
Whatever one makes of the stingy application of free exercise doctrine to cases that have come before the Rehnquist
Court, Smith clearly marked a major shift in free exercise doctrine itself. Smith represents a complete abandonment of the
compelling state interest and least restrictive alternative test
that had, a t least in theory, obtained since Sherbert u. Verner.
In doing so, the Smith Court completely undercut its own precedents. And it &d so without any notice or warning that it
was considering a significant shift in doctrine. No one, not even
the parties, had a n opportunity to brief the Court in Smith on
the importance of a constitutional standard that would afford
appropriate protection to religious exercise. Given the question
presented for review and the nature of the arguments presented i n the case, no one in the religious communities thought
that the pre-Smith standard was a t risk in Smith.
The test articulated in Sherbert for free exercise claims had
been thought secure because of the series of unemployment
compensation cases to which I made reference above.gs.These
cases ruled that the government could not burden religious
freedom unless the burden was justified-because it reflected a
supreme public necessity-and no less restrictive alternative to
the burden existed. Under these cases, however, no one made
the claim that religious faith and conduct were absolutely protected, but it was at least clear that the government could not
penalize a person for exercising religious faith.
The Smith case involved the sacramental use of peyote in a
ceremony of the Native American Church. The reverence that
Native Americans have for the buds of this cactus plant is tied
to the centuries-old belief that it contains the presence of deity
and has healing power. Recognizing these convictions, Congress
and nearly half of the state legislatures expressly exclude the
sacramental use of peyote from their prohibition of illicit drugs.
Even though Oregon did not have an exemption of this sort on
the books a t the time,'" the Oregon Supreme Court ruled
that the First Amendment prohibited the State from denying
unemployment benefits to the two Native Americans who were

99.
See supra text accompanying notes 67-93.
100. Oregon has recently given statutory protection to the religious use of peyote. See OR. REV.STAT.5 475.992 (1991).
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fired when they acknowledged having participated in the rituals of their church. The United States Supreme Court reversed
the state court, abandoning the solid line of unemployment
compensation cases I mentioned above, including Frazee, a
unanimous decision the year before.
If viewed as another drug case, the result in Smith was
unsurprising. In today's climate of drug wars, the mere presence of a non-scheduled drug in a case can turn some pretty
fine minds to mush. If one is prepared to launch a full scale
military invasion of Panama in order to apprehend a former
CIA operative turned drug dealer, I suppose that some will be
prepared to relax or even bend the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment in order to apprehend drug dealers in our inner
cities. And I imagine that the same folks who think that
Fourth Amendment rights must yield when the "D" word is
invoked will be casual about the First Amendment as well.
At another level of analysis, however, the Smith case was a
sweeping disaster for religious liberty because it was not just
another drug case, but a case about punishing people for their
religious worship. Thus one might be less angered by the formal, narrow holding of the case-that unemployment compensation benefits are unavailable to a person who is fired for
sacramental use of peyote-than by the Court's abandonment
of the requirement that the government demonstrate a compelling secular justification for overriding claims of religious conscience. I do not agree with Justice O'Comor's reading of the
case, but I can understand that reasonable persons-including
Dean Jesse Choper, an eminent First Amendment scholar who
was of counsel to the Attorney General of Oregon i n
Smith-could agree that Justice O'Connor correctly found that
the government has a compelling interest in the regulation of
the use of illegal drugs. Although she reached this result, she
refused to sign the opinion of Justice Scalia, who left the protection of religious conscience to the tender mercies of the legislatures. Justice O'Connor found this policy "incompatible with
our Nation's fundamental commitment to individual religious
liberty."lo1 For her, "the First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of those whose religious practices
are not shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility ?02
101.
102.

Smith, 494 U.S.at 891 ( O ' C o ~ o r ,J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 902.
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In the spirit of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Smith, I would like to offer two historical reasons for rejecting
the Court's decision in Smith. First, the compelling governmental interest standard conforms more closely to the historical
situation a t the time of the framing of the First Amendment.
Before Smith there was little scholarly exploration of the historical justification for religious exemptions. Shortly after
Smith was decided, however, a n article by a leading commentator gathered extensive evidence that the original meaning of
the Free Exercise Clause allowed judges to craft exemptions
from laws of general applicability.lo3 For example, under nine
of the original state constitutions-Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Rhode Island, and South Carolina-free exercise of religion
expressly prevailed, to use the phrase of James Madison,
"where it [did] not trespass on private rights or the public
peace."lo4 These provisions regarding free exercise of religion
appear to be a n early equivalent of the compelling state interest requirement. For example, Article 61 of the Georgia State
Constitution of 1777 provides: "All persons whatever shall have
the fiee exercise of their religion; provided it be not repugnant
to the peace and safety of the State."'" If free exercise guarantees may not be read to exempt believers from "otherwise
valid" laws, what would be the purpose of the "peace and safety" proviso? According to Professor M c C o ~ e l l "[tlhese
,
provisions were the likely model for the federal free exercise guarantee, and their evident acknowledgement of free exercise exemptions is the strongest evidence that the framers expected the
First Amendment to enjoy a similarly broad interpretation."lo6
The majority in Smith is composed of judges who often
complain that judges should not exceed their limited task of
construing the constitutional text in line with the intentions of
the framers. But these same judges ignored the historical evidence about the intent of the framers of the Free Exercise
Clause. Professor M c C o ~ e l loffered several examples of ex103.
Michael W. M c C o ~ e l l ,The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
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emptions of religion from generally applicable laws that date
from the beginning of the republic, implying that the framers of
the Free Exercise Clause intended to assert the primacy of
religious conscience over secular laws by protecting the right to
actively fulfill religious duties without state interference. Rather than account for this sort of evidence, the majority in Smith
invented their own judge-made policy restricting the protection
of the Religion Clause to overt intentional discrimination
against religion.
The Smith Court did not show the slightest regard for
serious legal history. Instead, it asserted that laws of general
applicability are now to be presumed valid even if they seriously interfere with someone's religious beliefs or practices. According to Justice Scalia, the only laws that the Free Exercise
Clause prohibits are those "specifkally directed at . . . religious
practice,"lo7 i.e., those intended to stifle a particular religion.
Anyone having a glancing acquaintance with politics knows
that no legislature will be cmde enough to admit that the purpose of its legislation is to harm a vulnerable religious organization. Since, in Scalia's view, the nation cannot "afford the
of striking down laws because they violate religious
belief, individuals must rely on the political process for legislative protection of their beliefs and practices. Justice Blackmun
wrote in a sharp dissent: "I do not believe the Founders
thought their dearly bought freedom from religious persecution
a 'luxury,' but an essential element of liberty."loS
Second, requiring a government attorney to demonstrate
the relative signifkance of the government's interest before it
may prevail over a sincere religious claim may be more necessary in our period of the republic than in the founding period
precisely because government a t all levels is now far more
intrusive than it was at the time of the founding. As one commentator has noted, "The style and scope of twentieth century
government has led to its involvement with ends and values of
varying imp~rtance.""~As Professor Mcconnell has argued,
religious exemptions are more necessary after the New Deal

Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
Id. at 889.
Id. at 909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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than i n the founding period since "[tlhe growth of the modern
welfare-regulatory state has vastly increased the occasions for
conflict between government and religion.""'

C. Post-Smith Developments
The consequences for religious liberty that have ensued
since Smith have been disastrous. The cases discussed in this
section illustrate graphically why the judiciary must not abandon its responsibility to enforce the limits placed on our government by the Bill of Rights. The Smith Court suggested that any
exemption for religious conduct from generally applicable laws
must come from the legislatures, not from the courts. The
Court acknowledged that "leaving accommodation [of religion]
to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage
those religious practices that are not widely engaged in."'"
This drastically understates the problem. The real consequence
of Smith is that sincere religiously based conduct is not to be
afforded significant protection from majoritarian control. Sending unpopular religious minorities to city councils and State
legislatures for relief is like sending the Jehovah's Witnesses to
the very legislative bodies in the 1930s that were doing their
level best to get rid of them.ll3
After Smith, governmental agencies have recklessly disregarded the protections that the Constitution affords to religious
conscience, belying the promise in Smith that the political
branches of government can safely be entrusted with the exclusive duty of protecting the first of our civil liberties. For example, a t the level of local government, zoning laws have been invoked both to prohibit a church from beginning its ministry
and even to regulate the number of persons to whom a church
may minister.ll4 Zero-population growth may be desirable in
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a particular local community, but the application of this policy
to a church's membership is the clearest example imaginable of
a n instance of governmental overreaching. At the federal level,
we have even had regulations purporting to tell the Amish
what to wear when they raise a barn.l15
. In a little-publicized case, the City of New York recently
invoked handicap access regulations to close down a shelter
operated by Catholic nuns for the homeless on the second floor
of a walk-up because the facility did not have a n elevator. The
nuns-members of Mother Teresa's religious order--offered to
carry upstairs any handicapped persons they encountered, but
the City would brook no exception to its neutral, generally enforceable rules. The City should have taken the prize for the
most frivolous governmental interest ever asserted against a
religious body engaged in charitable activity-the view that it
is better for the homeless to sleep in the street than in a building without an elevator. Under the Smith analysis, however, a
"generally applicable," if not very serious, rule was enough to
shut down a religious mission. The bureaucracy won, and the
nuns and the homeless lost.'16
The result of Smith is not just that the political branches
will find it hard to comprehend the need for properly drafted
religious exemptions from generally applicable rules. An even
more scandalous consequence of Smith is that federal judges
have shown signs of callous disregard for the first of our civil
liberties. The judicial record after Smith betrays a remarkable
insensitivity to religious liberty that requires remedial legislation by Congress. For example, in St. Agnes Hospital u.
Riddick,ll7 the district court found a compelling interest in
requiring a religious hospital to teach all residents how to
perform abortions. The lower court was apparently unaware of
the Court's diminution of the compelling interest requirement
in Smith. What is most striking about the case is that even on

115. See, e.g., OSHA Notice CPL 2 (Nov. 5, 1990) (postSmith revocation of exemption for Amish and Sikhs from requirement of wearing hard hats on construction sites). OSHA has withdrawn this regulation in part because of the intervention of the principal co-sponsor of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Congressman Stephen Solarz. The important thing to heed is that Smith sent to administrative agencies the message that they could--or, worse yet, they should-write
regulations with no care whatever for their impact on religious freedom.
116. Sam Roberts, Fight City Hall? Nope, Not Even Mother Teresa, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 1990, at B1.
117. 748 F. Supp. 319 (D.Md. 1990).
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a belief so deeply and widely held as conscientious objection to
performing abortions, state officials ignored the Court's suggestions that "it is desirable" for the political branches to provide
free exercise exemptions. l8
In Salvation Army v. Department of Community Affairs,''' the court decided that Smith required it to reject the
church's free exercise claim to an exemption from disclosure
requirements in the state's Room and Boarding Act. On remand, the government may yet be required by the court to
demonstrate a serious need to know the identity of the downand-outers aided by the Salvation Army. Under Smith, however, the church must now claim its exemption from the state's
reporting requirements-which the court acknowledged would
dissuade people in need of help from participating in the
church's rehabilitation program-by pressing a free speech
right or a right deriving from associational freedom, not one
grounded in the religious character of the church's ministry.
~
appliIn Montgomery v. County of C l i n t ~ n , 'a~ generally
cable, facially neutral law requiring autopsies was applied to
a n Orthodox Jew, for whom the mutilation of the body is a
sacrilege, and for whom burial must take place before sundown
on the day of death. Since the man had died in a n auto accident, whatever interest the government might have in ascertaining the cause of death of its citizens should have been satisfied. Yet once again, a mechanical approach to "generally
applicable" norms was allowed to trump a sincerely held religious tenet-in a manner that was manifestly not the least restrictive alternative means of effectuating the government's
interests. In Yang u. Sturner,"' another district court "regretfully" dismissed, on the basis of Smith, its earlier determination that the government was required to accommodate the
religious objection of Vietnamese Hmong to autopsies.
In Hunafa v. Murphy,'" the Seventh Circuit remanded a
suit by a Muslim state prisoner who had objected to service of
meals containing pork. The court noted, however, that Smith
had "cut back, possibly to minute dimensions, the doctrine that
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requires government to accommodate, at some cost, minority
religious preferences."lZ3
This political and judicial overkill in reaction to Smith is
akin to the reaction against the Jehovah's Witnesses in the
wake of the Court's first flag-salute case, Minersville School
District v. Gobitis,'* including licensing of the Witnesses and
waves of violent attacks on the Witnesses both by the police
and by vigilante mobs in order to drive them out of a state?
The majority opinion in Smith betrays massive insensitivity
not only to the history surrounding the adoption of the Free
Exercise Clause by the First Congress, but also to the history
surrounding its own precedents i n this century. The Court cited
Gobitis approvingly three times in Smith without even mentioning that it had been overruled in West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette.lZ6
The circumstances of Barnette are themselves instructive
for our times. The second flag-salute case came to the Court i n
the middle of the Second World War. By then, the Justices
were fully aware of the brutal oppression of minorities by totalitarian governments in Germany and Italy. I t was against the
background of the Niirnberg rallies with their massed flags and
swastikas that the Court reexamined the view that the national interest required the Jehovah's Witnesses to face criminal
sanctions rather than saluting a n object they sincerely regard
a s a "graven image" which the second commandment forbids
them fiom worshipping.12' In this setting, the Court clearly
adopted a standard that protected religious fieedom and freedom of speech far more broadly than the suggestion in Smith
that these freedoms are adequately secured merely by commanding the government to refrain from discrimination. Justice Roberts proclaimed a far broader vision of freedom in these
ringing terms: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein."lZ8
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It would be unfair to suggest that the Court intended all of
the far-reaching and outrageous results discussed above,
whether against the Jehovah's Witnesses in the 1940s or
against religion generally in the 1990s. But the damage to
religious freedom since Smith has been real, whether intended
or not, just as the damage t o religious freedom after Gobitis
was palpable and real, whether or not Justice Frankfurter and
his colleagues could fairly be said to have intended those harmful results.
Rightly understood, the Free Exercise Clause should
breathe life into the rest of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.
Religious liberty is the foundation of, and is integrally related
to, all other rights and freedoms secured by the Constitution. If
the power of government to coerce in matters of conscience is
denied, government is limited indeed. It follows, for example,
that it may not disturb religious belief and conduct any more
than it may curb free expression of political ideas. In the words
of the Williamsburg Charter, religious freedom is a "basic civil
liberty. . . ineradicable from the long tradition of rights and
liberties from which the [American] Revolution sprang."12g

IV. CONCLUSION:
THE NEEDFOR REMEDLAZ,LEGISLATION
For these reasons I recommend that Congress enact legislation that would restore the requirement that when a law
burdens a sincerely held religious belief or practice, the government may prevail over the religious adherent only if it demonstrates both that its interest in the law is truly compelling or of
paramount significance and that the means chosen to effectuate the governmental interest are the least restrictive alternative.
Congress has acted in the past t o protect rights more generously than the judiciary has chosen to do. For example, in
1986 the Court ruled that Jews were subject to dishonorable
discharge from the military for wearing yarmulkes.130 Congress responded promptly with legislation that reversed this
oppressive result.lsl No one has seriously suggested that Congress lacked the power to enact this provision. Indeed, Justice
Rehnquist's opinion fairly invited legislation by referring t o the
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federal power to regulate the armed forces, a provision expressly given to Congress in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.
And I know of no commentator who has suggested that this
legislation is invalid under the Establishment Clause. For
example, the Court unanimously sustained a provision in Title
VII exempting religious bodies from the general ban on employment discrimination on the basis of re1igi0n.l~~
The Smith Court did not reflect judicial restraint appropriate in a democracy, but rather abdicated the proper judicial
function of assuring that unpopular minorities will also have
the benefit of First Amendment protections when legislatures
turn a deaf ear to these minorities. To return to the parties
most directly affected by the Smith case, we need to walk with
the Native Americans down the long trail of broken promises
that they have travelled i n this country. In order to apply the
Golden Rule to this case, we have but to ask whether Jews
would be willing to have the government ban the Seder because
a new prohibition law failed to provide a n exception for liturgical use of wine, or whether Christians would be willing to let
the state exclude teenagers from participating in the celebration of Mass or the Lord's Supper because it cannot be proven
in court that a law of general applicability (the legal age for
drinking) was, in Scalia's words, "specifically directed a t . . .
religious p r a ~ t i c e , " ' ~or intended to stifle a particular religion.
The sacramental use of peyote, based on the view that
deity is present within the cactus plant from which peyote is
derived, may strike most of us as bizarre. That fact, which used
to be constitutionally irrelevant, has now become politically
relevant. To return to the Golden Rule, we need to think about
some aspect of our faith and practice that we would not want
the government to suppress because a majority of outsiders
find it strange. Then we need to think back to the point in the
history of our own religious organization when it was small and
vulnerable (all of us were in that position at one time or mother). Would we want our religious convictions to be governed by
the will of a hostile majority a t that moment?
The Williamsburg Charter eloquently answers this question:
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Religious liberty finally depends on neither the favors of the
state and its officials nor the vagaries of tyrants or majorities.
Religious liberty in a democracy is a right that may not be
submitted to vote and depends on the outcome of no election.
A society is only a s just and free a s it is respectful of this
right, especially toward the beliefs of its smallest minorities
and least popular comm~nities.'~'

James Madison was right when he wrote in his famous
Memorial and Remonstrance that the time to take alarm is a t
"first experiment with our liberties."'" Because I am truly
alarmed a t the disastrous consequences for religious liberty
that have already flowed from the Smith case, I hope that
Congress will act promptly to repudiate the tragic experiment
with religious liberty that the Smith case represents. I support
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as appropriate remedial
legislation designed to accomplish that end.'"
When the judiciary gives a minimalist interpretation of the
importance of religious liberty, it is time for the political
branches of government to extend greater protection through
legislation grounded in the values secured by the Bill of Rights.
And when we, the People, encourage our representatives to
safeguard the first of our civil liberties, religious freedom, we
are doing the very thing that this bicentennial season demands
of us: securing "the Blessings of Liberty for ourselves and our
Posterity" and promoting that "more perfect Union" that our
Constitution was ordained to establish.13'
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